Change in strategies is often mentioned as a source of memory development. However, though performance in working memory tasks steadily improves during childhood, theories differ in linking this development to strategy changes. Whereas some theories, such as the time-based resource-sharing model, invoke the age-related increase in use and efficiency of a strategy of active maintenance of memory traces, other theories, such as the task-switching model, do not mention strategy change. According to these models, either the cognitive load of the task or the duration of maintenance would account for recall performance. In the present study, we varied orthogonally these 2 factors. The results revealed that a different and unique factor affected recall performance at different ages: the duration of maintenance at age 6 and the cognitive load at age 7. As described by the task-switching model, younger children would not implement any maintenance activities while performing a concurrent task, their memory traces suffering from a time-based decay. This suggests that an increasing capacity of cognitive monitoring allows children to shift from this passive maintenance of memory traces to the active refreshing thereof at around the age of 7, reunifying the 2 current accounts of working memory development as 2 developmental stages.
One of the most striking aspects of cognitive development during childhood is the steady improvement in working memory capacity (Case, 1985; Halford, 1993; Pascual-Leone, 1970 ), a development reflected in the age-related increase in performance on working memory tasks. These tasks, also called complex span tasks, are designed to evaluate the capacity of working memory by requiring both the maintenance of information for subsequent recall and some concurrent processing. For example, in the counting span task designed by Case, Kurland, and Goldberg (1982) , children are asked to count dots on series of cards of ascending length and to recall the totals at the end of the series. The counting span, measured as the maximum number of totals that can be recalled in correct order, strongly increases with age. Among the various factors that are classically evoked in accounting for any developmental improvement, the discovery of new strategies and the change in strategy use have often been suggested (Flavell, 1979; Siegler, 1996) . Memory development is one of the main domains in which these changes in strategy use have been alleged and intensively researched as an essential determinant of development (Bjorklund, Dukes, & Brown, 2009; Schneider & Pressley, 1997) . Accordingly, recent accounts of the developmental increase in working memory span such as the time-based resource-sharing (TBRS) model proposed by evoke the leading role of strategy development, whereas other proposals such as the task-switching model of Towse and Hitch (1995) make no reference to any change in strategy.
In their task-switching model, Towse and Hitch (1995; Hitch, Towse, & Hutton, 2001; Towse, Hitch, & Hutton, 1998 , 2000 suggested that children switch between the two functions of working memory (i.e., storage and processing) in a way that is isomorphic to the design of the complex span tasks by alternating storage and processing episodes. For example, when counting the arrays of dots in the counting span task, their attention would be continuously and completely devoted to processing, whereas at the end of their count, they would shift their attention toward storage activities, before turning back to processing activities when presented with the next array. Towse and Hitch assumed that because the traces of the memory items decline during processing episodes (i.e., counting), recall performance should depend on their duration that determines the delay between encoding and recall. As a consequence, older children who perform counting tasks faster than younger children have to maintain the information to be recalled for a shorter period, explaining why they outperform younger children at recall. In accordance with the task-switching hypothesis, these authors have shown in several working memory span tasks that increasing the duration of the processing episodes while keeping the attentional demand of processing constant resulted in decreased recall in both children and adults. Thus, this model considers the developmental increase in working memory span as a mechanistic by-product of the increase in processing speed and the resulting reduction in delay of maintenance.
Alternatively, the TBRS model suggests that maintenance of information in working memory and recall performance on span tasks depend on a specific strategy named attentional refreshing (Barrouillet, Bernardin, & Camos, 2004; Barrouillet, Bernardin, Portrat, Vergauwe, & Camos, 2007; . This strategy is the ability to switch attention during the processing episodes to briefly reactivate decaying memory traces. As a consequence, the more the processing component of a working memory span task captures attention, the less the attention can be switched to maintain memory items. In accordance with this model, we have shown in adults as well as in children that recall performance depends on the proportion of time during which the processing component captures attention, thus impeding the refreshing of memory traces Barrouillet, Gavens, Vergauwe, Gaillard, & Camos, 2009) . This proportion of time operationalizes the cognitive load induced by the processing component. For example, in a recent study, we asked children from 7 to 14 years of age to memorize letters while they read series of digits presented after each letter (Barrouillet et al., 2009, Experiment 1) . To manipulate the cognitive load of this processing component, we varied the number of digits presented during fixed interletter intervals, with more digits to be read involving a higher cognitive load. As expected, in each age group, children's recall performance decreased with the increasing number of digits. This suggested that children, like adults, are able to rapidly switch their attention during processing episodes to maintain the memory traces of the letters. When the number of digits to read increases, this switching strategy is hindered, and forgetting can no longer be counteracted. However, the slope relating recall performance to the amount of processing to be done within each interletter interval (i.e., the number of digits to be read per unit of time) was flatter in younger children. This result suggested that younger children take less advantage of the increasing availability of attention when fewer digits have to be read. In a subsequent experiment with a similar design , Experiment 3), we showed that in even younger children aged 5 recall performance was no longer affected by variations in the number of items to be processed between two items to be remembered. This series of experiments in children is consistent with the idea developed by Bayliss, Jarrold, Baddeley, Gunn, and Leigh (2005) that younger children have a slower rate of reactivation than older children (see also Cowan et al., 1994) . Nevertheless, we have suggested that younger children may have not only a lower rate of reactivation when concentrating on the memory items, but also a lower capacity to control their activity and switch attention to the memoranda for refreshing purpose, hence the absence of effect of cognitive load in 5-year-olds. Hitch (2006) has suggested a similar idea. He proposed that the development of working memory in childhood might involve a shift from the macrolevel switching described in the task-switching model, whereby attention is directed by the structure of the task, to the microlevel switching assumed by the TBRS model, whereby attention continuously switches between processing and storage, even during processing episodes. This shift would arise from the development of executive processes and a greater capacity to control attention (Zelazo & Frye, 1998) . Such an improvement in cognitive flexibility would occur between 6 and 7 years of age (Diamond, 2006) . Thus, the aim of the present study was to test the existence of such a developmental shift around these ages. The insufficient executive resources or inefficient executive processes in younger children would not permit them to perform such a switching of attention at a microlevel. Thus, they would perform storage and processing when required by the structure of the task without trying to actively reactivate memory traces. With gain in attention control, older children would be able to use attentional refreshing and to interleave some bursts of reactivation of memory traces even during processing episodes. However, to the best of our knowledge, no study in children aged around 7 has ever tested this developmental shift, because the duration of maintenance and the cognitive load of the concurrent task have not yet been orthogonally varied at that age. Whereas studies within the taskswitching model varied the duration of maintenance while the attentional demand of processing was held constant (Towse & Hitch, 1995) , our previous study within the TBRS theoretical framework kept constant the duration of maintenance while manipulating the cognitive load (Barrouillet et al., 2009, Experiment 3) .
The originality of the present study was to fill this gap by manipulating both factors in the same experiment. We created three complex span tasks that differed in terms of either the raw duration or the attentional demand of the processing episodes. Children were presented with animals to be remembered, each animal being followed by a processing period consisting in naming the color of smileys appearing successively on-screen. A first condition involved the presentation of one color within a 4-s interanimal interval. A second condition was designed to involve processing periods of the same raw duration but with a higher cognitive load by presenting two colors instead of one color during the 4-s interval. A third condition involved the presentation of two colors but during intervals of 8 s, thus resulting in longer processing periods than in first and second conditions but in the same cognitive load as the first condition with a rate of one color every 4 s. Hereafter, these three conditions are referred to as one color short, two color short, and two color long, respectively. In summary, one color short and two color short had the same duration, which was shorter than for two color long, and one color short and two color long had the same cognitive load, which was smaller then two color short.
The hypothesis of a developmental shift from a macrolevel switching with a passive maintenance of the memoranda to a microlevel switching and the active strategy of refreshing memory traces during processing periods leads to contrasting predictions. If young children do not use any attentional strategy to refresh memoranda during processing, their recall performance would depend only on the raw duration of the processing periods during which memory traces decay. Thus, their recall performance should be poorer in the two-color-long condition than in the two short conditions, which should not differ from each other. On the contrary, older children who use the strategy of rapid switching would recall fewer items when the cognitive load of processing increases, whereas the raw duration of the processing periods should not have any impact. Thus, their recall performance should be poorer in the two-color-short condition than in the one-color-short and twocolor-long conditions, which should not differ from each other because both involve the same cognitive load.
Method Participants
Sixty-three kindergarteners (34 boys, 29 girls; mean age ϭ 5 years 8 months, SD ϭ 3.5 months) and 63 first graders (36 boys, 27 girls; mean age ϭ 6 years 9 months, SD ϭ 3.5 months) participated in the experiment. All the children were native French speakers, and none had difficulties with perceiving or naming the colors. Children attended four schools in rural Burgundy, and among each class they were randomly assigned to one of the three experimental conditions. Informed consent was received from children's carers.
Material and Procedure
Children were presented with series of one to four colored drawings of animals to be remembered (one to five for the 7-yearold group to avoid ceiling effect), with four series of each length (see Figure 1 ). This resulted in 16 and 20 trials for a total of 40 and 60 memory items in 6-and 7-year-old children, respectively. Sixty animals were used to avoid between-list interferences. Because we needed a large number of drawings and it would have not been possible to control for all potential variables that could affect recall, we presented the same material in the same order in the three experimental conditions. Each animal was presented in an invisible 6.5 ϫ 6.5-cm square in the center of the screen for 2,000 ms and followed by a period of 500 ms before the appearance of the first smiley. One or two smileys of 6.5-cm diameter colored either in yellow, blue, or red appeared successively in the center of the screen. In the one-color-short condition, each smiley was displayed on-screen for 2,667 ms and followed by a delay of 1,333 ms for a total 4,000 ms. In both two-color conditions, these values were either of 1,334 ms and 666 ms for a total of 4,000 ms in the short duration or of 2,667 ms and 1,333 ms for a total of 8,000 ms in the long duration. Children were asked to repeat the name of each animal after the experimenter and to name the color of each smiley presented. They were instructed to recall in correct order the name of the animals they had seen when the recall signal (a question mark) appeared on-screen.
The experimental session was preceded by a training phase. First, children were familiarized with the color task by naming the color of smileys displayed on-screen for six series. The series corresponded to the upcoming experimental condition with one or two colors and a long or short duration. Then they were shown in a booklet how the different screens would follow one another and they were trained to repeat the name of each animal and to name the colors of the smileys if needed. Finally, they performed on the computer two series of one animal and two series of two animals of the color-naming span task corresponding to the condition they were assigned to.
Results
Because no difference emerged between the schools, this factor was not included in the reported analysis. As far as the colornaming task was concerned, the rate of errors was particularly low, below 2% for the three conditions. The 6-year-old children (1.2%) made more errors than the older children (0.4%), but the effect just failed to reach significance, F(1, 120) ϭ 3.69, p ϭ .057, p 2 ϭ .40. The rate of errors did not differ across conditions, and the Age ϫ Condition interaction was not significant ( ps Ͼ .180). Moreover, it should be noted that the following analyses on recall performance were performed on both the entire sample and a sample restricted to the children who made no error on the color-naming Figure 1 . Illustration of trials for the one-color condition (A) and two-color-short condition (B). task (i.e., discarding fourteen 6-year-old and four 7-year-old children). Because the pattern of results was identical for both analyses, we report below the results on the entire sample.
In recall performance, most of the errors were omissions: 40% and 34% of the words by 6-and 7-year-old children, respectively. With such a high rate of omissions, and because children did not specify in which positions these omissions occurred while they recalled orally, scoring according to correct positions would have been hazardous. We then scored recall as the percentage of animal names correctly recalled whatever their position. We performed an analysis of variance on these scores with age (6 and 7 years) and conditions (either one color short, two color short, or two color long) as between-subjects factors. This analysis revealed that the percentage of animals correctly recalled was higher among older than younger children (65% and 58%, respectively), F(1, 120) ϭ 16.39, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .54. Although the effect of the experimental conditions did not reach significance, F(2, 120) ϭ 2.30, p ϭ .105, p 2 ϭ .15, it interacted with age, F(2, 120) ϭ 4.59, p ϭ .012, p 2 ϭ .30 (see Figure 2) .
A priori orthogonal comparisons were performed in each age group to test our specific predictions. As we predicted, recall performance in 6-year-old children was sensitive only to the raw duration of the color task but not to the cognitive load it involved. Their percentage of correct recall did not significantly differ between the two conditions that lasted the same duration (61% in one color short and 60% in two color short), although more distracting items were presented and processed in the latter (F Ͻ 1). However, as predicted by the hypothesis of a time-related decay of memory traces, increasing the duration of the processing period in the two-color-long condition resulted in a significant decrease in recall (54%) compared with the two short conditions, F(1, 60) ϭ 5.51, p ϭ .022, p 2 ϭ .98. A totally different pattern of results emerged in 7-year-old children whose performance was sensitive to cogni-tive load but not to raw duration. When the processing component was performed at the same pace (one-color-short and two-colorlong conditions), variations in raw duration did not result in any change in recall performance (68% in both conditions; F Ͻ 1). By contrast, as we already observed in adolescents and young adults, increasing cognitive load significantly decreased recall performance, and the two-color-short condition induced lower performance (60%) than the other two conditions , F(1, 60) ϭ 8.05, p ϭ .006, p 2 ϭ .99. It is interesting that this pattern of results was similar when we took into account the different list lengths (see Figure 3 ). We performed an analysis of variance on the percentage of correct recall with age, condition, and length as between-subjects factors but excluded Length 5, which was not presented to both age groups. We also discarded Length 1 because of a ceiling effect in both age groups (cf. Figure 3) . The effects described in the previous analysis remained unchanged, even under this restriction on lengths. Older children still outperformed younger children, F(1, 120) ϭ 56.48, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .36. The effect of the conditions failed to reach significance, F(2, 120) ϭ 2.49, p ϭ .087, p 2 ϭ .03, but it interacted with age, F(2, 120) ϭ 4.94, p ϭ .009, p 2 ϭ .06. The percentage of correct recall decreased from Length 2 to Length 4, F(2, 240) ϭ 115.58, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .52, and this effect was stronger in younger than in older children, F(2, 240) ϭ 4.56, p ϭ .011, p 2 ϭ .02. However, the length effect did not interact with conditions (F Ͻ 1), and the two-way interaction between age, length, and condition was not significant, F(4, 240) ϭ 1.04, p ϭ .39, p 2 Ͻ .01.
Discussion
The aim of the present study was to test the hypothesis of a developmental shift from a passive maintenance to an active refreshing strategy in working memory. In a complex span task in which the storage of animal names was interleaved with a colornaming task, 6-year-old children's recall performance appeared to depend only on the raw duration of the color-naming task but not on the cognitive load this task involves. On the contrary, at age 7, the cognitive load of the color task, which constrains the time available to refresh memory traces, determined recall performance, whereas the raw duration of the color-naming task did not have any impact. This suggests that the cognitive activities in younger children are directly mapped onto the structure of the working memory span tasks. Encoding occurs during the storage episodes, the memory items being passively held during the processing periods without any attempt of active maintenance, thus suffering from time-related decay. Recall is thus totally dependent on the duration of these periods, with longer periods resulting in poorer recall. By contrast, among older children, an increased capacity to control attention and monitor cognitive processes allows them to briefly deviate attention during the processing periods to reactivate memory traces. Thus, recall performance no longer depends on the raw duration of the processing periods but on the cognitive load of processing that determines the opportunity to refresh.
The current results do not imply that 6-year-old children never use, or do not have at their disposal, some mechanism of maintenance, by means of verbal rehearsal or attentional refreshing. The demands of the task on both attention and verbal processes could have been strong enough to entirely block these mechanisms. Conversely, the effect of cognitive load in 7-year-old children implies that, at least at age 7, children have and use some mechanism to maintain verbal information. The TBRS model considers the effect of cognitive load as a clue to an attentional refreshing mechanism. However, Camos, Lagner, and have recently shown that phonological rehearsal, as it was described in Baddeley's (1986) model, is also sensitive to manipulations of the pace of a verbal concurrent processing in adults.
Thus, both verbal rehearsal and attentional refreshing are affected by time constraints. At age 7, children could use either one or the other, or jointly use both mechanisms. When more time is available (i.e., when the pace of the concurrent processing is low), children could take advantage of it to rehearse or refresh the animal names they had to maintain. However, does this developmental pattern reflect a qualitative change in the use of memory strategy between ages 6 and 7, or might it be sustained by a quantitative change?
Several studies have been devoted to developmental changes in the use of verbal rehearsal by investigating the onset of the phenomena usually considered as clues for the use of this specific maintenance mechanism. They reveal that the word length effect on the probed recall, the speech rate/short-term memory span correlation, and the phonological similarity effect for visually presented material all appear around age 7, suggesting a sudden qualitative change. However, Jarrold and Tam (2011) reviewed recent studies in large samples showing some evidence of the use of verbal rehearsal in children younger than 7. These authors suggested that the comparison of nonadjacent small age groups would have facilitated the apparent dichotomy between children younger and older than 7, whereas microgenetic approaches on large samples could reveal a different picture. It must be acknowledged that our study falls into the former category and that the qualitative change that it shows might arise from the comparison of two separated points in a continuum. Concerning the attentional refreshing, which is a separated and independent mechanism of maintenance Hudjetz & Oberauer, 2007) , developmental studies are scarce and focused on older children . However, neurophysiological studies suggest that the cognitive flexibility needed to switch attention back and forth from processing to maintenance activities develops critically between ages 7 and 9 in association with maturation of the frontal lobe (see Anderson, 2002, for review) . Thus, it is possible that different strategies of maintenance exhibit different developmental patterns depending on the cognitive processes and executive functions involved. What the present study made clear is that recall performance in young children aged 6 depends on the delay between encoding and recall without any effect of the cognitive load of the intervening activity, suggesting that they do not use any active maintenance strategy. Nonetheless, it should be noted that our younger participants were not able to recall items in correct order, and as a consequence we had to use a lenient criterion that does not take serial order into account. This scoring procedure, which is rather unusual to assess working memory spans, could limit the scope of the present findings and make difficult the comparison with previous studies. However, it also highlights the dissociation between the maintenance of item and order information. In adults, Nairne and Kelley (2004) showed that variables such as phonological similarity affect differently item and order maintenance. In the related field of short-term memory, several models distinguish mechanisms of maintenance for item from those for order (Burgess & Hitch, 1999; Gupta, 2003; Henson, 1998) , and studies in young children have shown that item and order short-term memory reflects distinct capacities with different maturational rates (Majerus, 2009; Majerus, Poncelet, Greffe, & Van der Linden, 2006) . In working memory tasks, further studies are required to explore such dissociation and its developmental trajectory.
Apart from providing some insight into the way working memory strategies develop, our results are also relevant for more general working memory phenomena such as the sources of forgetting. Although the task-switching and TBRS models differ in their account of the development of working memory, they nevertheless agree on the main cause of forgetting, which is assumed to result from a time-based decay of the memory traces. However, a still ongoing debate concerning the causes of forgetting in working memory opposes in the literature two main conceptions: temporal decay and representation-based interference. According to the former conception, memory traces would fade away with the mere passage of time, their activation level inescapably decreasing over time if nothing is done to reactivate them. According to the latter conception, time would not have any direct causal role. Forgetting would occur through interference created by subsequent events. This interference could be provoked by the superposition of an increasing number of items in a composite memory or by feature overwriting. When successive items share some features, these features could be deleted and the memory traces degraded (Lewandowsky, Oberauer, & Brown, 2009 ). The current findings might bring some insights on the debate. To favor an interference account, one would first have to accept that the items used in the present study (animal pictures and colored smileys) might interfere with each other, which is possible because animals and colors could have been encoded in the same format, either visually or verbally. In line with this interference account, increasing the number of distractors in an unchanged processing period (one vs. two colors in short duration) induced poorer recall performance in 7-year-old children. However, although the same number of colored distractors was presented in both two-color conditions (short and long), recall performance varied and was better for the long condition, a result at odds with a simple interference account. To accommodate similar results, have suggested that an increased duration of presentation leaves more time to counteract interference effects and restore memory traces, for example, by elaborative rehearsal. However, such an additional assumption to the interference account is contradicted by the 6-year-olds' pattern of results. In the two conditions with the same number of distractors (two color short and long), the increase in duration did not result in better but in poorer recall performance. It is still possible to suppose that elaborative rehearsal is not efficient in young children, but still leaves the question unanswered as to why the interference effect could be stronger as time goes by. Moreover, the one-color-short and twocolor-short conditions, which differed in the amount of interference while lasting the same duration, did not differ in recall performance. This leads to an inextricable puzzle for the interference account, whereas all these results can be explained by assuming that memory traces suffer from a time-related decay the effects of which cannot be counteracted by refreshing activities in younger children. One would then continue to favor forgetting due to a temporal decay, whereas the explanatory power of the interference account is restricted to the results of 7-year-old children with the addition of some time-related mechanism of restoration of memory traces. Defenders of the interference account are left with the problem of explaining how temporal decay could affect memory in preschoolers and then disappear during childhood to be replaced by interference.
In conclusion, whereas the working memory functioning exhibited by 6-year-old children was described by the task-switching model as a stimuli-driven switching between processing and storage, the 7-year-old children's pattern of performance reflected the goal-directed microlevel switching described by the TBRS model. Thus, the present study reunifies the two main current accounts of working memory span tasks into a two-stage developmental model.
